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Thomas R. Mylott III*
As computer use has spread into an increasing number of per-
sonal and business transactions, disputes involving computer hard-
ware and software acquisitions have mushroomed. The complex
and technical nature of computer hardware and computer software,
collectively a computer system, generates an inordinate number of
disputes between vendors and purchasers.1
The first of these disputes to reach litigation were based on
contract causes of action. However, plaintiffs quickly discovered
that disclaimers and limitations of remedies contained in the con-
tract defeated many of these lawsuits. Soon disgruntled purchasers
of computer systems added claims of tortious misrepresentation in-
cluding fraud, fraudulent inducement, or negligent misrepresenta-
tion as additional or alternative bases for recovery. Yet these
approaches also encountered limited success. In search of a suc-
cessful remedy, buyers have increasingly asserted a new cause of
action based on a theory of "computer professional malpractice."
Due to the inadequacies of existing remedies, there is a need
for a computer professional malpractice cause of action. The unu-
sual nature of computer system transactions often enables vendors
to avoid liability. A malpractice cause of action for computer pro-
fessionals is a logical extension of existing malpractice liability for
other professionals.
I. THE NEED FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION
At the present time, many computer purchasers are suffering
Copyright © 1986 Thomas R. Mylott III. All Rights Reserved.
* A.B. 1974, Vasser College; J.D. 1977, Boston University. The author is an attorney
with the Dallas, Texas law firm of Peter S. Vogel, P.C. He has worked with computers since
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1. The term "purchaser" is used throughout this article even though most computer
software is distributed pursuant to a license.
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substantial damages for which there are no adequate remedies. This
is due in part to the complex and technical nature of computer sys-
tem transactions and in part to the limited theories of relief avail-
able to a plaintiff. Generally, contract claims arise out of executory
agreements, while misrepresentation claims concentrate on the de-
fendant's conduct prior to the formation of an agreement. Limita-
tions in the scope of these causes of action, combined with the legal
defenses available, often allow computer vendors to escape liability
for breach of contract, fraud, and related claims, even though they
have caused substantial damage to a customer. A purchaser of
computer hardware and software need a remedy that evaluates not
only the vendor's pre-contractual and executory conduct, but also
conduct which is not necessarily related to the performance called
for by the contract.
Common situations where vendors' conduct cause damage to
purchasers of computer systems involve transactions in which the
vendor, because of its superior knowledge and skill, knows or
should know that its conduct is detrimental to the purchasers; yet,
in spite of this knowledge, it neither alters its conduct nor informs
the buyer. The following are some examples of several common
situations.
In order to capture a sale many vendors will promise early de-
livery or threaten delayed delivery if the purchaser fails to place an
order by a specific date. Often the promised early delivery is ficti-
tious and actual delivery occurs within the vendor's standard deliv-
ery schedule. On the other hand, threatened delays are also
frequently illusory. Despite periods in the computer industry of
acute shortages, most vendors do not construct large systems with-
out a specific order nor do they change their manufacturing sched-
ules for medium and small systems because of a specific order.
However, the nature of manufacturing in the computer industry is
such that manufacturing schedules do vary considerably from one
vendor to another and vendors frequently change their approach to
the scheduling of manufacturing. The typical purchaser of com-
puter systems is usually totally unaware of what is the vendor's then
current approach to manufacturing. As a result a purchaser is often
vulnerable to a vendor's delivery promises.
Another typical situation involves under-configuration which
is a term in the computer industry meaning that the computer sys-
tem, particularly the hardware, provided to a purchaser is smaller
than what is required for operations. This usually occurs when a
vendor recommends a computer system that has sufficient capacity
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to accommodate a purchaser's immediate needs, but is inadequate
to accommodate any growth in those needs. Such is an under-con-
figuration only when the vendor knew or should have known that
the purchaser's need for additional capacity was imminent.
Vendors have a tendency to under-configure because of price
competition from other vendors and because of price resistance in
purchasers. That is to say buyers will often shop for the lowest
price. However, strict comparison between computer systems on
the basis of price is unreliable and often difficult because of the dif-
ference between competing vendors' technologies. Nevertheless, the
price differences play a role in many computer system acquisitions.
Vendors are aware of this phenomenon and often react by sug-
gesting a computer system that is smaller than the one the pur-
chaser has requested. Since the vendor is far better acquainted with
the capacities of its products than is the customer, the customer
rarely perceives the under-configuration.
Failure to disclose design bias in software is another technique
used by vendors to sell computer systems. When proposing com-
puter systems that include application software, many vendors sug-
gest software that has not been used in the customer's industry. For
instance, a vendor might propose to a purchaser in the discount
retailing industry software that was designed for the department
store industry. Both businesses are similar to in that they are both
in the retailing industry. However, the specific computer software
needs are likely to vary greatly between the two types of businesses.
The vendor may or may not be aware of the differences be-
tween the two types of businesses. Nevertheless, a vendor should
inform its customer of the software's design bias, since such a bias
can affect the software's performance significantly. However, most
vendors merely describe a software application in the most general
terms and state that the software will be suitable for the purchaser
after some limited modification.
Closely allied to a failure to reveal the design bias of software is
the failure to reveal the extent of modification necessary to render a
software application suitable for a purchaser's stated needs. Some
vendors are candid enough to inform a buyer that the proposed
software was designed for use in an industry different from that of
the buyer's. Yet, frequently these vendors eviscerate their candor
by recklessly underestimating the extent to which the software must
be modified to accommodate the purchaser's actual needs. More-
over, most sales personnel proposing the software have no concept
of and do not care about the extent of modification required.
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Often when the vendor has recommended software that has a
design bias to an industry other than the purchaser's, or the vendor
has concealed the extent of modification necessary, a vendor will
make repeated, unsuccessful attempts to correct the defects. This
process of attempting correction is generally done at the purchaser's
expense and labeled "modification." The worst aspect of this de-
ception is that the vendor has a low probability of success. In addi-
tion, the time spent attempting to correct the software causes undue
hardship and expense for the purchaser. If a dispute arises out of
such a situation, vendors typically claim that the problems and de-
lays are a result of the purchaser's demands for modifications. The
point that always seems to be lost on vendors is that had they pro-
posed software without a design bias or software that did not need
extensive modification, the purchaser's demands for modification
would have been modest.
Another way in which vendors' conduct can damage purchas-
ers arises out of vendors' failure to sufficiently describe their
software products. In failing to specify in detail the functions and
limitations of software, a vendor leaves the actual functions of the
software ambiguous. Usually this leaves purchasers believing that
they are acquiring the software they requested, when in fact the
software to be delivered may have little relation to the buyer's re-
quests or needs. Since thorough evaluation of software is a very
time-consuming process a purchaser would not ordinarily be in a
position to so evaluate the software prior to entering into an agree-
ment with the vendor. A purchaser will often have entered into the
transaction relying on the vendor's implicit representation that the
software has the functions the purchaser requested.
Understanding how the remedies presently available are often
inadequate to redress these wrongs and others committed in a com-
puter sales transaction requires an understanding of a typical com-
puter system acquisition and how that purchase might unravel.
Take for example the following hypothetical facts:
A manufacturer who is an experienced computer user (ECU)
has used a computer to perform various business functions for ten
years. ECU's computer system is programmed to do standard ac-
counting functions such as payroll and accounts payable. Vendor
ABC supplied and services the computer system. ECU's business
has grown substantially in the last ten years, and it has become ap-
parent that continued profitability depends on ECU's efficient man-
agement of an increasing backlog of orders for ECU's products.
ECU wants to expand the automation of its business by using a
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computer system in its customer ordering process and inventory
control. ECU communicates this desire to ABC who in turn rec-
ommends that ECU acquire a more powerful computer and addi-
tional software.
ECU believes that the ABC sales people have an in-depth un-
derstanding of ECU's needs. On numerous occasions, ECU's per-
sonnel explain the problems ECU is having in fulfilling customers'
orders. In the course of several meetings with ECU's management,
ABC's marketing representatives make representations that reas-
sure ECU that the recommended computer system acquisition will
solve ECU's problems and accomplish ECU's goals.
While the negotiations with ABC continue, the situation with
customers' orders deteriorates. The proposed acquisition of a new
computer has created rising expectations among ECU's employees.
ECU signs ABC's four standard agreements: one for the com-
puter hardware, one for the computer software, one for hardware
maintenance, and one for software maintenance. None of these
agreements reflect any of the representations made by ABC's mar-
keting personnel. In fact, the ABC standard contracts specifically
exclude all representations not expressly identified in the
agreements.
ABC had promised delivery within ninety days. Delay in the
computer system's arrival is the first sign of any trouble. ECU had
counted on the computer's arrival by early September, but Septem-
ber passes and ECU remains without the new computer. The tardi-
ness of the computer's delivery delays everything dependent upon
the computer's installation. ECU's customer orders are further
delayed and inventory problems increase.
Finally in late October the computer arrives and ABC begins
software installation. ABC's implementation of the software takes
far longer than represented. ABC attributes the delay to "minor
changes to the software necessary to fine tune it to meet ECU's spe-
cific needs."
In December, ECU begins to use the software. Within a few
weeks, though, it becomes apparent that there are problems with
the software. The computer system loses customers' orders and
makes incorrect adjustments to inventory totals.
ABC works on the problems immediately, and in a few days
claims to have solved them. However, even though the identical
problems do not recur, problems of the same general type do. Once
again ABC responds. As a result some of ECU's customers, tired of
the ordering confusion, have deserted ECU to find new suppliers.
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The problems continue. ABC continually makes changes to correct
specific problems but is unable to eliminate the general problems.
ABC continues in its efforts to resolve the problems, but things
do not improve. In fact the problems become more serious. Fi-
nally, ABC reassigns the software personnel working on ECU's
problems, and brings in "the first string team." The new workers
solve some of the intransient software problems. However, many
remain unsolved, and the malfunctions' deleterious impact on
ECU's business continues to mount.
Eighteen months after the delivery of the computer hardware,
ECU -engages a consultant to analyze the problems with the
software. The consultant concludes that the software design is un-
suitable for ECU's use and that in order to satisfy ECU's needs, the
software must be entirely rewritten. The consultant also concludes
that the hardware purchased is of insufficient capacity to process
ECU's inventory even when the new software is installed.
Finally after eighteen months of watching ABC struggle un-
successfully to install the computer system and after numerous
meetings with ABC's managers, ECU decides that ABC cannot sat-
isfy ECU's needs and demands the return of its monies and the re-
moval of the hardware and software.
ABC refuses and litigation ensues.
ECU has several possible causes of action both in contract and
in tort. For the purposes of discussion it is assumed that the possi-
ble bases for the vendor's liability arise out of its false representa-
tions and the failure of the computer software to perform as ECU
expected.
II. CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING OUT OF THE CONTRACT
There are two general contractual causes of action available to
ECU: breach of warranty and breach of contract other than breach
of warranty. Regardless of the theory upon which ECU proceeds, a
cause of action based on contract involving software presents spe-
cial problems to a plaintiff.
A. Purchaser's Problems in Contracting for Software
The first problem involves the written agreement itself. The
complex and incorporeal nature of software makes contracting for it
and describing the characteristics of a specific software application2
2. A "software application" is one or more computer programs organized for a com-
mon purpose such as accounts payable, payroll, or word processing.
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particularly difficult. For the purposes of a contract, software is
best described in terms of the detailed functions it performs, but
such descriptions are absent in many computer system sales con-
tracts. If the agreement between ECU and ABC resembled the
overwhelming majority of computer system contracts, it described
the software ABC was to provide in only the general terms. 3 In
other words, the contract description of the software will be vague
or ambiguous.
As a consequence, proving a breach can be very difficult in
computer disputes. Using vendors' standard contracts as the only
written evidence of the bargain in a computer transaction, many
important details of the transaction remain unspecified. This is par-
ticularly true in the case of computer software.
Purchasers may approach this problem in several ways. One
approach involves examining the vendor's software specifications to
determine if the software is suitable. Unfortunately, such specifica-
tions frequently do not exist in sufficient detail to provide purchas-
ers with all the information they should know about the software.
Furthermore, purchasers are often incapable of determining the ac-
curacy and usefulness of the specifications that do exist since thor-
ough knowledge of the software is typically exclusively in the hands
of the vendor.
Another approach that may be used involves performing tests
on the software or observing vendor demonstrations. Yet this ap-
proach also has limitations.
One limitation is that, because most software has so many
functions, it is often impossible to examine the workings of all of
those functions within the time available to a purchaser to review a
prospective computer system acquisition. Thus a company might
acquire software without having first inspected it or at least without
having performed more than a superficial inspection. Moreover,
use of the softwire in production in an actual business environment
may be the only effective way to adequately review the software's
performance and functions.
A second limitation is that many software features require that
a large amount of data already be stored or available to the com-
puter system to determine whether the software properly performs
many of its functions.
Some purchasers are willing to settle for the insufficient knowl-
edge they often derive from pre-acquisition testing and vendor dem-
3. This observation is based on the author's personal experience.
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onstrations because they know that software frequently requires
some degree of modification for installation at a specific purchaser's
site.
Probably, though, the most common reason a purchaser has
inadequate knowledge of the software's true characteristics is be-
cause the purchaser relied on the vendor's representations and as-
surances that the software would satisfy the purchaser's needs.
Regardless of the specific reason a purchaser is willing to re-
main ignorant of the software's functions, the result is the same: the
purchaser has neither first-hand knowledge of the software's func-
tions, nor is the software adequately described in the agreement
with the vendor.
Consequently, in those transactions where the parties inade-
quately describe and specify the software, determining what was de-
livered and what by the terms of the contract should have been
delivered presents a difficult question of fact. It follows that the
more difficult it is for a plaintiff to prove what was to be delivered,
the more difficult it will be for that plaintiff to establish that the
vendor has failed to deliver as agreed.
Many computer system acquisitions are accomplished by
means of vendors' standard contracts. Since those contracts usually
fail to adequately describe the software and the purchaser has no
first-hand knowledge of the software's functions prior to entry into
the agreement, the typical software buyer will confront this ques-
tion of fact in a suit for breach. Thus the typical buyer will have
greater difficulty in proving a vendor's breach than will those few
buyers who are able to describe precisely the software to be
delivered.
In a contract dispute the relevant inquiry should focus on what
the purchaser and the vendor thought they were exchanging. In the
vendor's opinion the software need only conform to its published
specifications. If modifications are necessary, the vendor will assert
its compliance with the modifications' specifications. The purchaser
on the other hand will expect the software to conform to the ven-
dor's oral and written representations as well as the purchaser's
conception of how such software should function in general. More-
over, the purchaser will expect the software to satisfy such special
needs as the purchaser expressed to the vendor and believed the
vendor understood at the time the vendor proposed the specific
software.
This is not to suggest that because a contract fails to clearly
specify the software to be delivered, the would-be plaintiff is with-
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out a remedy, but merely that such plaintiffs are at a substantial
disadvantage because they have the burden of proving what the de-
liverables were and what they were supposed to be. Yet without a
contractual specification of the deliverables or first-hand knowledge
of the software's actual functions, the purchaser must modify its
litigation strategy from claiming that the software fails to conform
to the agreement, to claiming that the vendor made false representa-
tions-intentionally so, as in fraud, or unintentionally, as in breach
of warranty. Moreover, even if a purchaser has the evidence to pre-
vail on its contentions about the software to be delivered, the pur-
chaser must nevertheless contend with two other related obstacles:
the parol evidence rule and merger provisions.
For the plaintiff whose cause of action depends on evidence of
its bargain omitted in the written agreement, the ability to admit at
trial oral and written statements that vary the terms of the contract
is critical. Yet the parol evidence rule usually excludes such evi-
dence. For instance, the Uniform Commercial Code(U.C.C.) sec-
tion 2-202 provides in part that
Terms... which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by
the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to
such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by
evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral
agreement ....
In addition to overcoming U.C.C. section 2-202, a purchaser
must avoid the merger or integration provisions of the vendor's con-
tract. Many vendors' contracts contain provisions that seek to ex-
clude evidence of the agreement not contained in the written
contract as well as to establish that the parties intended the contract
to be the final expression of their agreement.4
Some purchasers have been able to admit parol evidence to ex-
plain ambiguous terms,' but often computer vendors successfully
exclude oral and written evidence that would vary the terms of the
written agreement. For example, in Investors Premium Corp. v.
4. Earman Oil Co., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1980) involved a
typical integration provision which stated at 1294 in n.8:
The Customer agrees that this Agreement constitutes the entire agreement,
understanding and representations, expressed or implied, between the Cus-
tomer and Burroughs with respect to the equipment, and/or related services to
be furnished hereunder and that this Agreement supersedes all prior communi-
cations between the parties including all oral and written proposals.
5. See, e.g., Burroughs Corp. v. Chesapeake Petroleum and Supply Co., Inc., 282 Md.
406, 384 A.2d 734 (1978).
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Burroughs Corp.,6 the defendant was able to exclude evidence of
".. . representations or warranties claimed to have been made by
representatives of defendant prior to the said written con-
tract. . . ."I In Kalil Bottling Co. v. Burroughs Corp.,' the Arizona
Court of Appeals held that [plaintiff's] claims. . . based upon state-
ments made [by the seller] prior to the signing of the contract were
not actionable because of the parol evidence rule ."9 And, in Jaskey
Finance and Leasing v. Display Data Corp.,1° the district court held
that the plaintiffs could not base their breach of express warranty
claims on advertising or promotional material that was not present
in the written contract.11
B. Breach of Warranty
A purchaser such as ECU will likely claim breach of express
and implied warranties. A warranty claim will be grounded in the
provisions of Article 2 of the U.C.C. However, to prevail on a
breach of warranty claim, the plaintiff must clear several hurdles,
the first of which is whether software is within the purview of Arti-
cle 2 of the U.C.C. Several provisions of Article 2 suggest that its
remedies are not available when the subject matter of a claim is
software.
For example, U.C.C. section 2-102 states in part "[U]nless the
context otherwise requires, this chapter applies to transactions in
goods . . . ." U.C.C. section 2-105 defines "goods" as: "(a)...
all things. . . which are movable at the time of identification to the
contract for sale. . . ." U.C.C. section 2-106 defines "contract for
sale" as including "both a present sale of goods and a contract to
sell at a future time. A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the
seller to the buyer for a price."
The application of Article 2 to software raises several
problems.
First, the U.C.C. definition of goods as "things" suggests a cor-
poreal item, something capable of being seen and touched. Yet
software can be perceived only in the same sense as any written
material can. It is incorporeal. At the same time, vendors rarely
6. 389 F. Supp. 39 (D. S.C. 1974).
7. Id. at 44.
8. 127 Ariz. 278, 619 P.2d 1055 (1980).
9. Id. at 281, 619 P.2d at 1058.
10. 564 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Pa 1983).
11. Id. at 164. See also Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 343 N.Y.S.2d 541, 74 Misc. 2d 202




sell software as a "sale" is defined in Article 2. U.C.C. Section 2-
106 requires the passage of title to effect a sale, but nearly all
software is provided pursuant to a license or some other mechanism
that conveys less than a full title interest.
In spite of these concerns, the courts have found Article 2 ap-
plicable to software, when a sale of hardware has accompanied the
software. In Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,12 the
plaintiff tried to avoid the New York U.C.C.'s statute of limitations
by arguing that its agreement for hardware and software was for
services rather than goods. The court was unconvinced and held
the service aspect to be "merely incidental or collateral to the sale of
goods."13  In Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register
Corp.,14 using similar reasoning in construing New Jersey law, a
court agreed with the plaintiff's contention that a lease and software
agreement were within the reach of Article 2. The reasoning in
these two cases leaves open the question of how a court would rule
if the software component of the transaction were considered more
significant and thus no longer "merely incidental or collateral to the
sale of goods."
At the same time, there is authority, construing the Texas
U.C.C., that a hardware lease accompanied by a software "pack-
age" is not subject to the U.C.C. is
While in the hypothetical ECU's ability to claim under Article
2 would appear to have crossed the threshold because there was a
sale of computer hardware, it is clear that if a lease transaction were
involved, the outcome would be less certain. Moreover, if the ven-
dor were to argue that the software was a significant component of
the transaction, there remains another possibility of the vendor's
evading the U.C.C.
Assuming the U.C.C does apply, purchasers claiming a breach
of express warranty must rely on U.C.C. section 2-313. That sec-
tion states in part:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
12. 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979).
13. Id. at 743, quoting Dynamics Corp. of America v. Intern. Harvester Co., 429 F.
Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
14. 479 F. Supp 738 (D. N.J. 1979), modified on other grounds 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir.
1980).
15. 0. J. & C. Co. v. Gen. Hosp. Leasing, Inc., 578 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) 7
Computer Serv. L. Rep. (Callaghan) 660. Compare with another Texas case, W. R. Weaver
Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) in which a court found a
hardware lease to be outside the U.C.C., but nevertheless upheld the parties' agreement that
the U.C.C. applied to the software.
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(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to
the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the
goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
The software purchaser relying on an express warranty theory
based on U.C.C section 2-313 faces factual problems such as
whether the vendor's representation was an affirmation of fact or an
opinion, and whether the representation was part of the basis of the
bargain. 1
6
Similarly, those purchasers seeking to prove breach of implied
warranties must contend with articulating a concept of
merchantability for software and proving up the elements of fitness
for a particular purpose. 7
However, the U.C.C.'s express and implied warranty provi-
sions provide no relief for purchasers where the vendor's contract
disclaims such warranties.
A typical warranty disclaimer resembles the one upheld in In-
vestors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.'8 There the warranty
disclaimer stated:
THERE ARE NO UNDERSTANDINGS, AGREEMENTS,
REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED (INCLUDING ANY REGARDING MERCHAN-
TIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE)
NOT SPECIFIED HEREIN, RESPECTING THIS CON-
TRACT OR EQUIPMENT HEREUNDER. (Emphasis in the
original).' 9
The courts have frequently upheld similar warranty disclaimers in
computer transactions.20
In addition to warranty disclaimers, vendor contracts often
contain limitation of damages provisions. Limitation of damages in
general is authorized by U.C.C. section 2-719. Limitation or exclu-
sion of consequential damages, unless unconscionable, is specifically
authorized by U.C.C. section 2-719(3). Such damage limitations
16. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 273-82 (1972).
17. U.C.C. §§ 2-314 and 2-315 (1977). See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 16.
18. 389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C. 1974).
19. Id. at 45.
20. Kalil Bottling Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 127 Ariz. 278, 619 P.2d 1055, 1058 (1980);
Jaskey Fin. & Leasing v. Display Data Corp., 564 F. Supp. 160, 162 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Inves-
tors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39, 45 (D.S.C. 1974); Office Supply
Co., Inc. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 783 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
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have also frequently survived attack.21
Thus even where breach of warranty claims are not limited by
warranty disclaimers, any damages recoverable are likely to be se-
verely limited or excluded entirely by limitation of damages
provisions.
C. Other Contract Remedies
For contract causes of action other than breach of warranty,
U.C.C. section 2-711 gives a purchaser several additional options.
Depending upon the facts, an aggrieved buyer might allege the ven-
dor's repudiation, non-delivery, or delivery of non-conforming
goods. In circumstances where the vendor has repudiated the
agreement or simply failed to make delivery, U.C.C. section 2-711
presents the alternatives of recission,22 cover,23 and recovery of
damages for non-delivery.24
However, these are rarely the problem in the typical computer
system acquisition. Instead, as in the hypothetical, the issue centers
on the performance or adequacy of the computer system delivered.
Thus the purchaser's remedies are either rejection of the goods pur-
suant to U.C.C. section 2-601 or revocation of acceptance pursuant
to section 2-608.
Unfortunately, in the typical computer system transaction, by
the time any problems are discovered, the buyer has possessed the
software too long to reject it25 and has failed to follow the proce-
dural requirements of section 2-608 necessary to revoke acceptance.
D. Statute of Limitations
Plaintiffs in computer system transactions proceeding under a
contract theory also have frequent problems with the statute of lim-
itations and with contract provisions that shorten the limitations
period. Contractual provisions reducing the statute of limitations
have been upheld in computer disputes.26
21. Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39, 45 (D.S.C. 1974);
Office Supply Co., Inc. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 788 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
22. U.C.C. § 2-711(1) (1977).
23. U.C.C. § 2-711(1)(a) (1977).
24. U.C.C. § 2-711(1)(b) (1977).
25. U.C.C. § 2-602(1)(b) (1977).
26. Milwaukee v. Northrup Data Sys., Inc., 602 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1979); IBM Corp. v.
Catamore Enter., Inc., 548 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1976).
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E. Performance by Vendor
A final problem with a purchaser's seeking a purely contract
remedy is that the vendor may fully perform the written agreement
and nevertheless leave the purchaser damaged. As already dis-
cussed, most vendor contracts fail to describe the transaction in its
entirety or in any type of specific detail. The standard vendor con-
tracts do not accurately reflect the bargain made and the written
contractual requirements of vendor performance are minimal. As a
result a vendor can easily perform the contract in accordance with
the agreement's express provisions and still leave the purchaser
without the benefit of the bargain expected. At the same time the
vendor may well have known what the user expected and en-
couraged the user in such expectations without having committed
itself contractually to delivering as expected.
Obviously one solution for purchasers' difficulties with con-
tract claims would be to incorporate all of the oral and written rep-
resentations in their written agreements with vendors. Many
purchasers, though, lack sufficient knowledge and market power to
negotiate an agreement with a computer vendor, and many com-
puter vendors will negotiate only very large transactions. In addi-
tion, many purchasers are insufficiently knowledgeable about
computer transactions to understand the dangers of inadequate
software specification and acceptance procedures. Aware of these
weaknesses, vendors frequently take advantage of their superior
knowledge to secure a purchaser's agreement to a contract that
neither fully nor accurately describes the transaction.
In the hypothetical case, it is clear that ECU has not received
what it had expected. Yet for various reasons, such as ineptitude,
the market power of the vendor, or the nature of the industry, ECU
is not likely to have a written agreement that reflects the representa-
tions upon which its expectations were based.
ECU thought it was acquiring a computer system that would
implement certain functions within a reasonable time. ECU was led
to believe that the computer had a certain capacity and that the
software had a certain functional ability. However, due to the con-
tract's failure to accurately reflect the bargain made, the likely inad-
missibility of parol evidence to vary the agreement's terms, together
with the contract's impediments to warranty claims, ECU cannot
reasonably rely on a contract cause of action.
III. CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING OUT OF MISREPRESENTATION
When purchasers of computer systems sue for breach of con-
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tract, they often additionally allege tortious conduct on the part of
the vendor.27 While most of these tort claims are labeled as fraud
or fraudulent inducement, some are pleaded as negligent
misrepresentation.28
However characterized, such causes of action share the com-
mon allegation of a false representation. They differ mainly in the
significance they attach to the reason the representations are false.
Fraud and fraudulent inducement claims require proof of a de-
fendant's scienter, or intent to deceive to establish liability.29 Negli-
gent misrepresentation claims require proof only that the defendant
was negligent in making the statements.30
Regardless of the differences between the scienter and negli-
gence categories of misrepresentation, purchaser/plaintiffs alleging
either cause of action will encounter several obstacles to their
claims. Some of the obstacles are unique to claims requiring proof
of intent to deceive; others present problems for plaintiffs proceed-
ing under either theory.
In a jurisdiction that requires proof of scienter, the purchaser
in our hypothetical would have to prove that the vendor knew the
falsity of its representations and thereby intended to deceive the
purchaser.3
The intent to deceive requirement generates two related
problems for the would-be plaintiff. First, there may have been no
intent to deceive. For instance, the salespeople may have been sim-
ply giving their opinion of the computer system and its capabilities.
Second, the speaker may have believed statements to be true when
in fact they were false. That is, there may have been an innocent
misrepresentation.
Innocent misrepresentations arise out of a number of circum-
stances. One cause of misrepresentations is the number of vendor
personnel who are disseminating information about a particular
product. Due to the manner in which vendors distribute and mar-
27. Harford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Seibels, Bruce & Co., 579 F. Supp. 135 (D. Md. 1984);
Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Rio Grande
Jewelers Supply, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 101 N.M. 798, 689 P.2d 1269 (1984); Aplications,
Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 672 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1982).
28. Rio Grande Jewelers Supply, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 101 N.M. 798, 689 P.2d 1269
(1984).
29. Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis. 2d 166, 169-70, 168 N.W.2d 201, 202-03 (1969); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1981).
30. See Slater Trust Co. v. Gardiner, 183 F. 268, 270-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1910); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 528 (1981).
31. Fruit Indus. Research Found. v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 406 F.2d 546, 548 (9th
Cir. 1969).
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ket computers, there are many organizational levels from which
statements and representations may emanate. For instance, the
marketing people in the field may make many statements based on
what they were told by their marketing superiors, who in turn Will
make statements based on what they were told by their engineering
staff.
To further complicate matters, sometimes misunderstandings
within a vendor's organization create misrepresentations. Engineer-
ing personnel often fail to convey to marketing employees vital in-
formation concerning the vendor's products. The sales people may
confuse a product's design or conceptual goals with the actual spec-
ifications, and then use those goals as representations of fact. In
addition, a vendor may have failed to modify the marketing materi-
als when the technical staff modified the hardware or the software.
The transgression can range from an innocent misrepresentation
caused by a misunderstanding within the company to an excessive
reliance on a company's own marketing hyperbole. In either event,
proving the requisite scienter becomes very difficult.
The majority of jurisdictions either require proof of an intent
to deceive or imply an intent to deceive from the conduct of the one
making representations. 2
Regardless of the theories of misrepresentation available to a
plaintiff, all theories of misrepresentation require that the represen-
tation pertain to an existing fact.33 Plaintiffs in computer cases
often fail in their claims of misrepresentation because they are un-
able to prove that the misrepresentation concerns an existing fact. 4
Rather, the misrepresentation is frequently held to be a promise of
future performance for which there is no tort liability unless there
was at the time the representation was made an intent not to
perform. 35
Reliance on the misrepresentation is another element required
in all misrepresentation causes of action. Computer purchasers
may be unable to prove reliance on a vendor's representations. For
example, in Aplications, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,36 the Second
32. See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 206 (1968), 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 25 (1943).
33. Fruit Indus. Research Found. v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 406 F.2d 546 (9th Cir.
1969) (under the scienter theory); Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919
(E.D. Wis. 1977) (under negligent misrepresentation theory); Gerner v. Mosher, 58 Neb. 135,
78 N.W. 384 (1899) (under the strict responsibility theory in a case not involving computers).
34. Fruit Indus. Research Found. v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 406 F.2d 546, 549-50 (9th
Cir. 1969); Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919, 925 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
35. See supra note 34.
36. 672 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1982).
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Circuit affirmed the district court's holding "that [the] plaintiff's
president and sole shareholder was more knowledgeable in the field
of computer science than the representatives of the defendant with
whom he dealt and much too knowledgeable to rely on publicity
blurbs issued by the defendant."37
In Fruit Industries Research Foundation v. National Cash Reg-
ister Corp.,38 the fact that plaintiff's representative knew of a com-
puter printer's slow printing rate prior to execution of the contract
prevented the plaintiff from later asserting the slowness as the basis
for a claim of misrepresentation. The court reached this conclusion
despite the fact that the defendant's salesman assured the plaintiff
that the slow speed was unimportant to the plaintiff's intended
use.
39
Computer purchasers have had other problems in attempting
to prove negligent misrepresentation. For instance in Rio Grande
Jewelers Supply, Inc. v. Data General Corp.,' a purchaser's allega-
tions of negligent misrepresentations were overcome by the pres-
ence of an integration provision in the contract with the
defendant.41 And in Call Computer v. Data General Corp.,42 the
plaintiff's claims of negligent misrepresentation were dismissed
when they were determined to contain the same factual allegations
as did the plaintiff's claims for breach of implied warranties.
When a computer purchaser does prevail over a vendor in a
fraud cause of action, the damages recovered can be substantial.43
However, legal and factual roadblocks present substantial obstacles
to a purchaser's successful recovery.
IV. NEGLIGENCE AS A CAUSE OF ACTION
There has been some debate about the role of negligence as a
valid cause of action in computer disputes. Courts have recognized
negligence as a cause of action in computer disputes concerning
credit bureaus. For example, in Thompson v. San Antonio Retail
Merchants Association (SARMA),4 an action under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act45 (the "Act"), the district court held the defendant, a
37. Id. at 1077.
38. 406 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1969).
39. Id. at 549.
40. 101 N.M. 798, 689 P.2d 1269 (1984).
41. Id. at 800, 689 P.2d at 1271.
42. No. 409415 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara County, March 11, 1980).
43. Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 684 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1982).
44. 682 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1982)
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e and 1681o (1982).
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credit reporting service, liable for providing erroneous credit infor-
mation about the plaintiff. The defendant's software permitted
credit history information to be changed by subscribers to the credit
reporting service. A subscriber would request the defendant's com-
puter system to retrieve a consumer's credit file, and in response the
defendant's computer system would select the consumer file whose
identifying characteristics, such as name and social security
number, most closely matched the identifying characteristics of the
consumer requested. However, under this method, the file retrieved
was not necessarily the file for the consumer requested. If the sub-
scriber decided that the information on the file was that of the con-
sumer sought, the subscriber could use and change the information
regardless of any disparity in the identifying characteristics of the
information. In fact, once the subscriber accepted the retrieved file
as being the correct one, the defendant's computer system automati-
cally supplemented the information in its files with any new infor-
mation supplied by the subscriber.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's deci-
sion that the defendant had negligently failed to comply with the
Act. The circuit court cited section 168le(b) of the Act which re-
quires that a consumer reporting agency follow reasonable proce-
dures to insure the accuracy of their reports,46 and concluded that
the defendant owed plaintiff a duty of reasonable care in its prepara-
tion of a credit report.47
The defendant's conduct was determined to be negligent in two
ways.
First, SARMA failed to exercise reasonable care in programming
its computer to automatically capture information into a file
without requiring any minimum number of 'points of correspon-
dence' between the consumer and the file or having an adequate
auditing procedure to foster accuracy. Second, SARMA failed
to employ reasonable procedures designed to learn the disparity
in social security numbers (between the plaintiff and another con-
sumer who had a bad credit history).48
While the reasoning in Thompson may be limited to situations
where the cause of action accrues under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, at least one court, in Invacare Corp. v. Sperry Corp.,49 clearly




49. 612 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
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affirmed the use of negligence in computer disputes.5"
Thus negligence may be a viable cause of action available to
ECU. Nevertheless, the negligence standard in most instances inad-
equately describes the business relationship between the purchaser
and the vendor. Most purchasers in computer systems transactions
place significantly greater trust and reliance on the vendors than do
purchasers in other sales transactions. The complexity of the sub-
ject matter and the relative inequities of skill and knowledge be-
tween the parties justifies such purchaser behavior. Although the
degree of trust and reliance is usually insufficient to give rise to a
fiduciary duty, an ordinary negligence standard fails to consider the
relative disparities of knowledge and skill.
In evaluating an alleged incident of negligence, the focus is on
determining what was ordinary and reasonable behavior under the
circumstances. In Thompson, the court had some guidance from
the statute. "When a consumer reporting agency prepares a con-
sumer report, it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maxi-
mum possible accuracy of information concerning the individual
about whom the report relates."51 Section 168le(b) specifies that in
the preparation of consumer reports the reporting agency must use
reasonable procedures to assure maximum accuracy. Thus the trier
of fact knows at least that the reasonableness of the procedures are
to be evaluated in light of the goal of maximum accuracy. Maxi-
mum accuracy is likely to be something in excess of what the trier
of fact might determine is reasonable accuracy. Without the stat-
ute's assistance, however, the trier of fact could have concluded that
some less stringent requirement of accuracy was appropriate, and
consequently absolved the defendant of liability.
Many claims of negligence in computer related disputes will
lack statutory guidance concerning the appropriate criteria for de-
termining reasonable care. The standard of care in negligence is
reasonable care, but without statutory assistance as in Thompson,
the trier of fact will decide what is reasonable. Therefore, the trier
of fact will determine the standard of care.
In many instances, this determination will suffice. However,
computer disputes often turn on technical issues that require an un-
derstanding of computers well beyond the knowledge of non-ex-
perts. Because of insufficient knowledge concerning the technical
matters, a trier of fact might easily conclude that computers are too
complicated to expect anyone to understand well and set a com-
50. Although perhaps for the wrong reasons as discussed infra.
51. Thompson, 682 F.2d at 513 citing U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (1982).
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mensurately low standard of care. On the other hand, the trier of
fact might adhere to the popular notion that computers should be
infallible and set a standard of care closer to strict liability than
ordinary negligence. Furthermore due to the technical complexity
of the issues, there may be no trier of fact competent to determine a
standard of reasonable care when computer-related negligence is al-
leged. This situation might well result in the prevention of any
standard of care developing in negligence claims arising out of com-
puter system acquisitions. In other words the purchaser/plaintiff
and vendor/defendant would face a "standard of care" that was not
standard. Without a standard the purchaser/plaintiff faces substan-
tial uncertainty in selecting what evidence to offer and how to pres-
ent it.
However, the speculative absence of a standard of ordinary
care in computer system acquisitions is by no means the most for-
midable obstacle to a purchaser alleging ordinary negligence. Pre-
vailing on a negligence claim where there is also a contractual
relationship is difficult. The plaintiff must prove that the defendant
had a duty to the plaintiff independent of the obligations articulated
in the parties' agreement. 2
Many courts have concluded that such negligence claims are
not cognizable. In Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,53
the district court held that plaintiff/purchaser's claims of negligent
design, manufacture, and installation were a restatement of plain-
tiff's breach of warranty claims and failed for the same reasons as
did the warranty claims. 4
In Jaskey Finance and Leasing v. Display Data Corp.,5 the
plaintiff alleged that the computer equipment and programs ac-
quired were "negligently designed because they were insufficient to
perform their contemplated tasks."56 The district court dismissed
plaintiff's claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure reasoning that
When a plaintiff characterizes a claim that a product was insuffi-
cient to perform its designated function as a tort claim, and al-
leges solely economic loss without any allegation of physical
harm to a person or property, courts have decided that such a
52. Chesapeake Petroleum & Supply Co., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 6 Computer L. Serv.
Rep. (Callaghan) 768, 775 (Md. Ct. 1977), affd, 384 A.2d 734, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep.
(Callaghan) 782 (Md. App. 1978).
53. 389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C. 1974).
54. Id. at 42, 45-46.
55. 564 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
56. Id. at 165.
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claim sounds in contract and not in tort. (And that) a number of
jurisdictions have held such economic losses are not recoverable
in tort.57
The district court thus concluded that the plaintiff had failed to
state a cause of action as a matter of law. Office Supply Co., Inc. v.
Basic/Four Corp.,"8 is in accord. In Office Supply, the claim that
the defendant/vendor was negligent in the manufacture, design, in-
stallation, and repair of a computer system was dismissed since
"Under California law economic losses are not recoverable in
tort.",59
Other courts have held that absent a special relationship be-
tween the parties, they will not recognize a cause of action for negli-
gence between parties to a contract.6 °
Thus in searching for a remedy for the wrongs suffered, a com-
puter system purchaser must overcome substantial obstacles
whether it sues on a theory of breach of contract, misrepresentation,
or negligence. The inadequacies of these causes of action and the
inability of computer system purchasers to surmount the unique
legal and factual obstacles they face often leave the damaged pur-
chaser without any remedy at all.
V. JUDICIAL VIEW OF COMPUTER MALPRACTICE
Recognizing the inadequacies of the presently available causes
of action, a few computer system purchasers have advanced theories
of computer professional malpractice. The courts have generally re-
acted unfavorably to malpractice claims in computer disputes.61
One reason for this judicial resistance arises out of courts' reluc-
tance to create what they perceive to be new torts. Another reason
is these malpractice claims have frequently approached the issue
from a difficult perspective.
The courts have offered several reasons for denying malprac-
tice claims. One reason is that the relationship between computer
professionals and their customers is not a relationship entitled to
the same consideration courts afford other professional relation-
57. Id. at 166.
58. 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
59. Id. at 791.
60. See Accusystems, Inc. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 580 F. Supp 474
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
61. Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979); Chat-
los Sys., Inc. v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp 738 (D. N.J. 1979), modified on other
grounds 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980).
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ships. In Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,6 2 the plain-
tiff sought to have New York's medical malpractice concept of
"continuous treatment" apply to its tort claims of negligence and
computer malpractice.63 The "continuous treatment" approach
holds that the statute of limitations for medical malpractice begins
to run ". . . 'at the end of a continuous treatment or hospital-pa-
tient or physician-patient relationship,' and not at the last date of
malpractice."'
On appeal from a summary judgment and dismissal based on
the running of the statute of limitations, Triangle unsuccessfully ar-
gued that New York's "continuous treatment" concept should ap-
ply to Triangle's claims and extend the statute of limitations. The
court held that ". . . there is wholly lacking in the case at bar that
professional relationship upon which application of the doctrine (of
continuous treatment), in any context, depends."65
Although New York courts had extended the "continuous
treatment" principles to professionals other than physicians, the
Triangle court concluded that the other instances were based "...
upon that particular relationship of trust and reliance that exists
between a lay plaintiff and a professional defendant."66
The court's reasoning suggests that before applying a malprac-
tice concept to computer sales transactions a relationship much
closer than the ordinary arm's length business relationship must ex-
ist between plaintiff and defendant. Whether the Triangle court
would have required that the relationship be a fiduciary one is
unclear.
In Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp.,67
rather than examining the relationship between the plaintiff and de-
fendant, the court questioned whether those people in the computer
industry had a special responsibility to their customers. In Chatlos,
the plaintiff's complaint alleged breach of contract, breach of war-
ranties, and fraud. However, in a post trial memoranda, plaintiff
offered two additional causes of action, computer malpractice and
strict liability.68 In denying these claims, the court held that
"computer malpractice" is premised upon a theory of elevated
62. 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979).
63. Id. at 744.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 745.
66. Id.
67. 479 F. Supp. 738 (D. N.J. 1979), modified on other grounds 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir.
1980).
68. Id. at 741 n.1.
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responsibility on the part of those who render computer sales and
service. Plaintiff equates the sale and service of computer sys-
tems with established theories of professional malpractice. Sim-
ply because an activity is technically complex and important to
the business community does not mean that greater potential lia-
bility must attach.69
To some extent an inquiry to determine if computer profession-
als have a special responsibility to their customers is an examination
into the relationship with their customers. Yet in Triangle, the
court appears to focus on the "trust and reliance" placed in the
professional, while in Chatlos, the focus is exclusively on the profes-
sional's activity and whether the nature of that activity should in-
crease the professional's responsibility to clients.
Both the approach in Triangle and that in Chatlos have merit
in attempting to determine if computer professionals are to have
increased liability.
While the opinion is unclear, the argument the Chatlos court
rejected appears to have advanced two bases for subjecting com-
puter professionals to increased liability: first, that the work per-
formed by computer professionals is technically complex; and
second, that computer professionals' services are important to the
business community.70 If this statement of the plaintiffs arguments
is accurate and if the plaintiff meant "important" to be construed as
"beneficial," the second argument would appear to undermine
plaintiff's position. Traditional notions of tort liability assign less
potential liability to beneficial activities than to dangerous activi-
ties.71 The greater potential benefit an activity has, the greater the
risk of failure the law will tolerate before liability attaches.72
On the other hand, if by use of "important" the plaintiff meant
that computer professionals' activities have an unusual potential for
detrimental consequences to a business, then the argument has
some merit. The more dangerous an activity is, the greater the pro-
pensity of a court to find liability for damage when that activity
causes harm. 3
The apparent first argument of the plaintiff in Chatlos, techni-
cal complexity, has merit as well, but the technical complexity itself
is insufficient reason for increased liability.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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However, a better argument for imposing malpractice liability
on computer professionals is the disparity of knowledge between
computer professionals and their customers and an implied repre-
sentation that the computer professional is skilled and will exercise
such skill.
One court appears to have focused on the relative disparity of
knowledge between a vendor and purchaser. Invacare Corp. v.
Sperry Corp.74 was an action for breach of contract, fraud, and neg-
ligence against the seller of a computer system. On a motion for
summary judgment, defendant Sperry argued that the negligence
claims asserted were really claims of computer malpractice and,
therefore, failed to state a claim.75 The plaintiff had claimed that
(Sperry) was negligent in that in recommending the (computer
system) ... to (Invacare), (Sperry) knew, or in the exercise of
ordinary care, it should have known, that the systems were to-
tally inadequate to provide (what was promised to Invacare)
(Sperry) was negligent in advising (Invacare) ... because in the
exercise of ordinary care (Sperry) should have known that the
programs furnished could not satisfy (Invacare's) requirements
(Sperry) was negligent in assigning employees to examine
(Invacare's) requirements and to recommend data processing
products to fulfill (Invacare's) needs who lacked sufficient knowl-
edge and expertise to fulfill these functions.7 6
In Invacare, the court held that the complaint stated a valid cause
of action:
Such allegations state a valid claim of negligence. Negligence is
the lack of ordinary care. It is a failure to exercise that degree of
care which a reasonably prudent person would have exercised
under the same or similar circumstances.77
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the Restatement of
Torts section 299A, comment b which provides that:
Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowl-
edge, one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a
profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge
normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in
good standing in similar communities.7 s
74. 612 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
75. Id. at 452.





The Invacare court equated ordinary care with the "ordinary" stan-
dard of care in a profession.
Invacare alleges that the personnel provided by Sperry failed to
perform at a level of ordinary care. If machinists, electricians,
carpenters, blacksmiths, and plumbers, are held to the ordinary
standard of care in their professions, the court fails to see why
personnel in the computer industry should be held to any lower
standard of care.79
Ordinary care, though, is not equivalent to the ordinary standard of
care in a profession. Ordinary care is the standard of care a reason-
able person is expected to exercise under the circumstances. A rea-
sonable person in this sense is a person without special skill or
knowledge. What is ordinary to a professional is likely to be ex-
traordinary to the reasonable person. The Restatement of Torts
supports this distinction by defining the ordinary standard of care in
a profession as skill.
a. Skill, as the word is used in this section, is something more
than the mere minimum competence required of any person who
does an act, under the rule stated in section 299. It is that special
form of competence which is not part of the ordinary equipment
of the reasonable man, but which is the result of acquired learn-
ing, and aptitude developed by special training and experience.
All professions, and most trades, are necessarily skilled, and the
word is used to refer to the special competence which they
require.80
By relying on section 299A of the Restatement of Torts, the Inva-
care court used defendant's skill as the criteria for judgment. How-
ever, the plaintiff's allegations were complaints about the
defendant's level of care and competence. The Restatement of
Torts distinguishes between care, competence, and skill.
Section 298. Want of Reasonable Care.
When an act is negligent only if done without reasonable care,
the care which the actor is required to exercise to avoid being
negligent in the doing of the act is that which a reasonable man
in his position, with his information and competence, would rec-
ognize as necessary to prevent the act from creating an unreason-
able risk of harm to another.
Section 298, comment a. Meaning of "care."
The word "care" denotes not only the attention which is neces-
sary to perceive danger, but also the caution required to avert it
79. Id.
80. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A comment a (1965).
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once it is perceived. Care is to be distinguished from competence
. . ., although the two qualities are usually associated. Compe-
tence is a matter of the ability or capacity of the individual to use
care; care is the attention and caution exercised in the use made
of that competence ....
Section 299. Want of Competence.
An act may be negligent if it is done without the competence
which a reasonable man in the position of the actor would recog-
nize as necessary to prevent it from creating an unreasonable risk
of harm to another.
Thus the court's reasoning in Invacare missed the point. The plain-
tiffs allegations were those of ordinary negligence. Invacare did not
allege that Sperry failed to exercise the skill and knowledge nor-
mally possessed by members of Sperry's profession or trade. Inva-
care's claims were couched in language invoking section 298 and
section 299 rather than section 299A. The holding in Invacare that
section 299A stated the standard of care for a computer vendor is
the first step in establishing a tort of computer professional
malpractice.
VI. MALPRACTICE AS A CAUSE OF ACTION
The concepts of malpractice contained in the Restatement of
Torts section 299A have been extended to a variety of professionals
and tradesmen.81 Section 299A requires these people to adhere to a
greater than ordinary standard of care because of their express or
implied representation of greater than ordinary skill.
For instance, Fantini v. Alexander 2 involved a personal injury
to a student receiving karate instruction. After only twenty hours
of instruction the student engaged in a "free fight" which the de-
fendant staged for demonstration purposes only. There was testi-
mony at trial that a student with 20 hours of instruction was too
inexperienced to have engaged in the demonstration that caused in-
jury to the plaintiff. The trial judge had entered a judgment of dis-
missal at the close of plaintiff's evidence. On appeal the court
reversed and remanded citing the Restatement of Torts section
299A as "the applicable rule for measuring defendant's conduct
")83
81. Fantini v. Alexander, 172 N.J. Super. 105, 410 A.2d 1190 (1980) (karate instruc-
tor), Chambers v. Wes. Arizona CATV, 130 Ariz. 605, 638 P.2d 219 (1981) (cable TV install-
ers), Hardt v. Brink, 192 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Wash. 1961) (insurance agent).
82. 172 N.J. Super. 105, 410 A.2d 1190 (1980).
83. Id. at 108, 410 A.2d at 1192.
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In Chambers v. Western Arizona CATV84, defendant installed
an antenna cable for cable television in plaintiff's mobile home.
However, in connecting the cable to the mobile home, defendant
placed the cable on plaintiff's lawn rather than burying it as was the
approved practice. The trial court granted defendant a directed
verdict holding that the plaintiff had failed to make out a prima
facie case for negligence. On appeal the court held that defendant
owed plaintiff a duty by virtue of defendant's skill and there was
sufficient evidence that defendant had breached that duty. Here the
court also looked to section 299A to establish the defendant's duty
to the plaintiff."
In many ways a cause of action for malpractice resembles a
claim of ordinary negligence. There is a duty of care and a breach
of that duty proximately causing damages. While the concept of
malpractice in many professions has expanded beyond negligence,
negligence remains the root of malpractice claims. Where malprac-
tice differs significantly from negligence is in the standard of care.
While the negligence standard is one of ordinary care by a reason-
able person, malpractice requires a professional to exercise the same
level of care as other professionals. In other words, a professional
must use a professional level of care.
In analyzing a set of facts, use of a malpractice analysis should
increase the likelihood that the facts are sufficient to sustain a cause
of action. Since malpractice has a higher standard of care than neg-
ligence, a malpractice cause of action should make prevailing in
claims against a tortfeasor easier than would negligence. Given the
same set of facts, a higher standard of care will result in liability
more often than a lower standard of care. Thus it should be easier
to prove malpractice in computer disputes than it would be to prove
negligence.
VII. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING CAUSES OF ACTION
There already exists a malpractice cause of action for many
professionals such as physicians, attorneys, architects, and engi-
neers.8 6 Regardless of the ways in which malpractice theories
against professionals can differ, all such professionals share a liabil-
84. 130 Ariz. 605, 638 P.2d 219 (1981).
85. Id. at 607, 638 P.2d at 221.
86. Moon v. United States, 512 F. Supp 140 (D. Nev. 1981) (physicians); Cook v. Irion,
409 S.W.2d 475 (rex. 1966) (attorneys); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873
(rex. Civ. App. 1971) (accountants); Moloso v. State, 644 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1982) (architects
and engineers).
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ity for breach of a duty of care. 7 The standard of care for such
professionals is the requirement that they exercise the skill and
knowledge normally possessed by the members of their profession.
For instance concerning attorneys, the Texas Court of Civil Ap-
peals in Cook v. Irion,88 held that an attorney "impliedly represents
(among other things) . . . that he possesses the requisite degree of
learning, skill, and ability necessary to the practice of his profession
and which others similarly situated ordinarily possess." 89 And con-
cerning architects, the Eighth Circuit, in Aetna Insurance Co. v.
Ilellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc.,90 concluded that "[A]n archi-
tect is not a guarantor or an insurer but as a member of a learned
and skilled profession he is under the duty to exercise the ordinary,
reasonable technical skill, ability and competence that is required of
an architect in a similar situation . ...1 In accord are Moon v.
United States92 concerning physicians and Shatterproof Glass Corp.
v. James9 3 concerning accountants.
In discussing the applicability of malpractice concepts to com-
puter professionals, it is useful to compare and contrast the relation-
ship computer professionals form with the public to the
relationships that other professionals form. The relationship of
computer professionals to the public is unlike some professional re-
lationships in the areas of the likelihood of causing physical harm,
confidentiality, and licensing or educational requirements. At the
same time, however, it is unclear how crucial these characteristics
are to theories of malpractice.
For example, the likelihood of physical harm to others is great-
est in the professional relationships entered into by physicians, ar-
chitects and engineers. However, since it is hard to imagine how
people could be physically injured by attorneys or accountants in
the course of their professional relationships, the potential for in-
jury is obviously not a decisive factor in imposing malpractice liabil-
ity. In any event, the potential for physical harm from computer
systems is likely to increase as the use of computer-controlled fac-
tory robots and medical devices spreads.
The duty of confidentiality is another area where some profes-
sionals' relationships appear to differ from those of a computer pro-
87. See supra note 86.
88. 409 S.W.2d 475 (rex. 1966).
89. Id. at 477, quoting Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954).
90. 392 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1968).
91. Id. at 476.
92. 512 F. Supp. 140 (D. Nev. 1981).
93. 466 S.W.2d 873 (rex. Civ. App. 1971).
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fessional. For instance, physicians and attorneys have a duty to
protect the confidences of their patients and clients.94 Yet engineers
and architects have no such duty, and still remain liable for
malpractice.
In regard to licensing and educational requirements, there is
the issue of how "professional" one must be before liability should
attach. Attorneys, physicians, accountants, architects, and engi-
neers are generally accepted to be professionals. There are formal
licensing or certification requirements in every state. Usually entry
into the profession is predicated upon attaining a minimum level of
education and passing an exam. As a corollary, most states reserve
the performance of certain specified services to members of the pro-
fession. In addition, practice of those services without a license is
generally prohibited.
Although the state regulation of the provision of certain serv-
ices is usually advanced as a means of protecting the public from
incompetent practitioners, there are compelling arguments that
such regulated groups sought barriers to entry into the profession as
a method of restricting the supply of practitioners to the pecuniary
advantage of those who held licenses.
Admittedly, computer professionals do not share the same offi-
cial, professional status anywhere as do these other professionals.
There are no mandatory licensing or educational requirements for
people in the computer industry. Thus, if being a "professional"
means being a member of such a group, computer professionals ob-
viously do not qualify. However, the absence of such requirements
in the data processing field may be due to the fact that the industry
is so young or because the public has yet to perceive any threat from
incompetence in the field. On the other hand, the absence of a for-
mal licensing structure may merely indicate that computer profes-
sionals have not yet acquired sufficient legislative skills to restrict
entry into their profession.
The imposition of malpractice liability on members of these li-
censed professions might have some basis as a political quidpro quo
for state support of the barriers to entry. However, it is unlikely
that licensing or educational requirements alone constitute the bases
for imposing malpractice liability.
On the other hand, some important similarities between com-
puter professionals and other professionals do exist. The relation-
94. Clark v. Grigson, 579 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Hollard v. Brown, 66
S.W.2d 1095 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
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ship of computer professionals to the public is similar to most other
professional relationships in the areas of knowledge and reliance.
Computer professionals have substantially greater skill and
knowledge about computers than does the public in general. One of
the likely instances where this difference in knowledge will be signif-
icant is in computer system acquisitions. In such transactions,
many prospective purchasers lack the expertise to know if the ven-
dor's proposals are adequate for the purchaser's needs. The vendor
is in the best position to reconcile the products proposed with the
functions requested. The purchaser is aware of and is likely to rely
on the vendor's superior knowledge and skill. In fact, the vendor is
likely to emphasize that superior knowledge in order to make the
sale.
This situation can resemble the relative degrees of knowledge
and skill in a relationship between a physician and patient. A pa-
tient is rarely in a position to evaluate the wisdom of one course of
treatment over another and must rely on the superior knowledge of
the physician for a recommendation.
The Restatement of Torts section 299A focuses on this dispar-
ity of knowledge and skill in determining liability. Liability under
this section is based on the underlying assumption that members of
a profession or trade have knowledge or skill that is superior to
those who are not members of the trade or profession. This is cer-
tainly the case with computer technology.
Another similarity between computer professionals and other
professionals is the element of reliance. In addition to the difference
in knowledge and skill between lay people and professionals, the
public relies on the skill and knowledge of professionals such as
physicians, attorneys, accountants, architects, and engineers. And
these professionals impliedly represent their having such skills and
knowledge.9 Similarly, computer professionals impliedly represent
that they have superior knowledge and skill, and computer system
purchasers usually rely on this representation.
Although the court in Triangle96 did hold that a relationship
with computer professionals could not be characterized by the same
trust and reliance as could the professional relationships of attor-
neys, accountants, and architects, 97 it is apparent that the court had
never attempted to purchase a computer system. If they had, they
would have encountered what every purchaser does: The fact that
95. See, eg., Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W,2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
96. 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979).
97. Id. at 744-45 and 744 n.14.
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the vendor represents that it has greater knowledge and skill con-
cerning computers than the purchaser, and that the purchaser must
usually rely on those representations.
In the services they perform, computer professionals most re-
semble a combination of accountants, architects, and engineers.
Like architects and engineers, computer professionals create specifi-
cations and supervise the implementation of specifications. Yet,
while architects and engineers rarely construct the buildings they
have designed, computer professionals usually create the object of
their specifications; they write computer software and propose com-
binations of hardware and software to purchasers. In order to de-
velop computer software and to assemble configurations of
computer hardware and software, computer professionals, like ac-
countants, often perform financial and business analysis.
Courts have held architects and engineers liable for profes-
sional negligence during construction,9" for a defective design dis-
covered long after the completion of construction,99 in the
supervision of projects,1"' and in the selection of materials and
equipment used in construction.1' Accountants have been found
liable for misrepresentations regardless of whether they were made
innocently, deliberately, or with dishonest or fraudulent intent.102
The conduct of computer professionals can and often does
closely resemble these instances of architect, engineer, and account-
ant malpractice. For example, both before and after installation of
a computer system, a computer professional can demonstrate insuf-
ficient skill and knowledge in the design of computer hardware or
software. Such a professional can mismanage the installation pro-
cess of a computer system, particularly when software modifications
are required. In the selection of computer hardware and software
for a particular purchaser, the computer professional can fail to rec-
ommend a computer system that satisfies the purchaser's special
needs or intended use. Finally, a computer professional may mis-
represent, innocently or otherwise, one or more facts to a purchaser.
Since accountants, architects, and engineers can be held liable
for such tortious conduct, computer professionals should have a
similar legal accountability.
98. Moloso v. State, 644 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1982).
99. Soc'y of Mount Carmel v. Fox, 90 Ill. App. 3d 537, 413 N.E.2d 480 (1980).
100. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 392 F.2d 472 (8th Cir.
1968); Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 78 Ill. App. 2d 153, 222 N.E.2d 584 (1966).
101. Scott v. Potomac Ins. Co., 217 Or. 323, 341 P.2d 1083 (1959).
102. Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
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Restatement of Torts section 299A is a useful means for articu-
lating the higher standard of care a computer professional must ad-
here to in order to avoid liability. The Restatement of Torts sets a
standard greater than that of ordinary care. If such a standard were
applied to computer professionals, there would be a cause of action
which could realistically provide an effective remedy to computer
system purchasers.
The claims of the hypothetical buyer, ECU, against the vendor,
ABC, rest primarily in the misrepresentations of ABC and in the
failure of the software to function as ECU intended. Due to the
problems mentioned above in litigating on a contract theory, 0I on a
tortious misrepresentation theory,"° or on a negligence theory, 05
ECU is likely to be without a remedy. A malpractice cause of ac-
tion would allow ECU to have judicial scrutiny of the vendor's con-
duct in light of a professional standard of care.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the search to hold vendors of computer systems accounta-
ble, an injured purchaser has several possible remedies. However,
the current state of the law often allows vendors to escape liability
in many circumstances where the vendor's conduct has clearly
caused substantial damage. By requiring computer professionals to
answer to a standard of care commensurate with their skill and
knowledge, a tort of computer professional malpractice would give
purchasers a remedy for vendor misdeeds when other remedies are
useless. The language of the Restatement of Torts section 299A
offers the foundation for such a cause of action.
103. See supra Part II.
104. See supra Part III.
105. See supra Part IV.
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